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Abstract
It is now generally recognized that in order to make significant
advances in accident prevention, the focus of industrial firms must shift
from assessing the risks of existing production and manufacturing
systems to discovering technological alternatives, i.e. from the
identification of problems to the identification of solutions.  Encouraging
the industrial firm to perform (1) an inherent safety opportunity audit
(ISOA) to identify where inherently safer technology is needed, and (2)
a technology options analysis (TOA) and to identify specific inherently
safer options will advance the adoption of primary prevention strategies
that will alter production systems so that there are less inherent safety
risks.   Experience gained from a methodology to encourage inherently
safer production in industrial firms in the Netherlands and Greece is
discussed.  Successful approaches require both technological and
managerial changes.  Firms must have the willingness, opportunity,
and the  capability to change.  Implications for the EU Seveso, IPPC,
and EMAS Directives are also discussed.
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1. THE CONCEPT OF INHERENT SAFETY
An important consideration, which has received relatively little attention among firms
and government, is the sudden and accidental releases of chemicals that affect both
workers and communities.  This contrasts with the greater willingness to address the
problems from "gradual pollution” of the environment stemming from expected by-
products and waste of industrial, agricultural, transportation and extraction activities.
Inherent safety is an approach to chemical accident prevention that differs
fundamentally from secondary accident prevention and accident mitigation [1-9].
Sometimes also referred to as “primary prevention” [1,2], inherent safety relies on
the development and deployment of technologies that prevent the possibility of a
chemical accident.1  By comparison, “secondary prevention” reduces the probability
of a chemical accident 2, and “mitigation” and emergency responses seek to reduce
the seriousness of injuries, property damage, and environmental damage resulting
from chemical accidents.
Secondary prevention and mitigation, by themselves, are unable to eliminate the risk
of serious or catastrophic chemical accidents, although improved process safety
management can reduce their probability and severity.  Most chemical production
involves “transformation” processes, which are inherently complex and tightly
coupled. “Normal accidents” are an unavoidable risk of systems with these
characteristics [11].  However, the risk of serious, or catastrophic, consequences
need not be.  Specific industries use many different processes.  In many cases,
alternative chemical processes exist which completely or almost completely
eliminate the use of highly toxic, volatile, or flammable chemicals [12].
Inherent safety is similar in concept to pollution prevention or cleaner production.
Both attempt to prevent the possibility of harm -- from accidents or pollution -- by
eliminating the problem at its source.  Both typically involve fundamental changes in
production technology: substitution of inputs, process redesign and re-engineering,
and/or final product reformulation.3  Secondary prevention and mitigation are similar
in concept to pollution control and remediation measures, respectively, in that each
involves only minimal change to the core production system.  In particular,
secondary accident prevention focuses on improving the structural integrity of
                                                          
1 The authors are cognizant of the conventional wisdom that no technology is entirely safe, and that it might be
more accurate to describe various technologies as safer.  However, some technologies are in fact absolutely safe
along certain dimensions.  For example, some chemicals are not flammable, or explosive, or toxic.  Some
reactions carried out under atmospheric pressure simply will not release their byproducts in a violent way.
Thus, inherent safety is, in some sense, an ideal analogous to pollution prevention.  Just as some might argue
that pollution prevention can never be 100% achieved, purists may argue that technologies can only be made
inherently safer, not safe.  Articulating the ideal, however, makes an important point:  dramatic, not marginal,
changes are required to achieve both.  Like pollution prevention, the term “inherently safe” focuses attention on
the proper target.
2 In the accident prevention literature in the traditional chemical engineering journals, there is much attention
given to the concept of the “root cause” of accidents.  Enquiry into root causes has stimulated mostly secondary
prevention by attempting to make production technology more “fail-safe,” that is, stronger vessels and piping
able to sustain higher pressures, neutralizing baths, and automatic shut-off devices.  A different tradition of
analyzing accidents comes from tort and compensation law, where the “but-for” test is used to apportion
responsibility between faulty technology and alleged careless workers.  If the technology is not “fool-proof”,
that is, it is not impossible for a human to initiate an event leading to an accident, then the firm is held at least
partially liable -- because, “but-for faulty design, the accident would not have occurred.”  Primary prevention
promotes “fool-proof”, rather than “fail-safe” technology. Another formulation is “error tolerant” [10].
3 Although inherent safety and pollution prevention are similar in concept, there are practical differences
between the two that have, so far, made adoption of inherent safety measures less attractive to industry than
pollution prevention/cleaner production.
production vessels and piping, neutralising escaped gases and liquids, and shut-off
devices rather than changing the basic production methods.  When plants expand
beyond the capacity they were initially designed for, secondary prevention capacities
may be exceeded.  Sometimes, overconfidence in these added-on safety measures
may invite an expansion of production capacity.  Accidents, of course, may also
disable secondary safety technology, leading to runaway chemical reactions.
The superiority of pollution prevention and cleaner production as a tool of
environmental policy has been recognised for more than a decade in both Europe
and North America [13, 14].  International meetings of the Cleaner Production
Roundtables and the Pollution Prevention Roundtables are held annually in Europe
and North America, respectively.  The United Nations Environment Programme has
spearheaded an aggressive cleaner production program [13].  The U.S. EPA has
established a hierarchy of policy choices, with pollution prevention given the highest
priority over reuse or recycling, treatment, or disposal [15].  In 1990, the U.S.
Congress codified, as national environmental policy, a preference for pollution
prevention over pollution control, when it passed the Pollution Prevention Act.  The
EU supports its Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) by
funding research in Seville, Spain for the identification of Best Available Techniques
(BAT).
In 1982, the European Union adopted the famous EU Directive (82/501/EC) on the
Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, the so-called "Seveso
Directive". It requires member states to ensure that all manufacturers prove to a
"competent authority" that major hazards have been identified in their industrial
activities, that appropriate safety measures--including emergency plans--have been
adopted, and that information, training and safety equipment have been provided to
on-site employees [16].  A second Seveso Directive (96/82/EC) came into effect in
February 1997.  Seveso II strengthens the original provisions and coverage of
accident-prevention activities, as well as broadens the types of installations, which
must comply.  Particularly worthy of note is the mention of inherent safety as a
preferred approach to preventing chemical accidents in the accompanying guidance
document for the preparation of the safety report required by the revised directive
[17].
Finally, a discussion of inherent safety (or cleaner production) would be incomplete
without noting the importance of the stage of the production process where inherent
safety is implemented.  Production systems can be thought of a being comprised of
at least four stages, which are found in each product line or productive segment in
complex, multi-productline operations:
  primary process
|
secondary process
|
 ancillary process
|
             product
The distinction between primary, secondary, and ancillary manufacturing and
production processes -- and final products as well -- is an important one for the
identification of inherent safety opportunities.  It also helps to explain why the
receptivity to the adoption of inherent safety technology might be different for firms
that (1) are already in existence and do not contemplate change, (2) firms that are
contemplating changes or contraction/expansion of capacity (what we call operations
in transition), and (3) new facilities or operations.
An illustrative example is offered in the context of casting and electro-plating metal
screws.  The primary process is the casting of the screw (both toxic fumes and
dangers from workers coming in contact with molten metals are recognised
hazards).  The secondary process is electroplating (this too presents both toxic and
corrosive hazards).  The ancillary process is cleaning or degreasing the screw using
organic solvents (which can be both toxic and flammable).  The screw itself may
have sharp edges and present an occupational hazard.  If the firm focuses on the
ancillary process, it might be relatively easy for it to search for and find an
alternative, non-polluting, non-flammable cleaning process.  Technological
innovation would be not likely be required.  If the electroplating is the process that
needs to be modified, at least a new process might have to be brought into the firm --
usually by the diffusion of alternative plating technology -- but the firm would be
expected to be uncomfortable about changing a proven method and taking a chance
on altering the appearance of its product, even if it is a separate operation.  The
most resistance could be expected by demands on the primary process.  Here
innovation might be necessary and the firm is not likely to invest in developing an
entirely new casting process.  Even if an alternative casting technology were
available, the firm is unlikely to be enthusiastic about changing its core technology.
On the other hand, firms that have already been searching to change even their core
technologies because of high energy, water and materials costs, or for safety and
environmental reasons, may be willing to plan for change.  However, some firms in
transition to new or expanded operation may delay implementing approaches to
safety that require new investments if the remaining life of the existing facility, or
portions of the facility, is limited.  New operations would expected to be the most
receptive to examining technology options that affect core, secondary and ancillary
processes -- and even final products.
2. INCENTIVES, BARRIERS, AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ADOPTION OF
INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY
The reasons that firms are embracing pollution prevention and cleaner production
today are because of (1) the increased costs of continuing the current practices of
waste transport/treatment and pollution control, (2) liability for environmental damage
due to industrial releases of toxic substances, (3) increasingly available information
about pollution and toxic releases to the public, and (4) the EU IPPC Directive [18]
(and possibly the EMAS [19] and ISO 14000 [20] requirements), and to a lessor
extent the Pollution Prevention Act of 1996 in the United States [21], force increased
attention to changing production technology, rather than relying solely on end-of-
pipe, add-on technologies. Thus, both economic and informational mechanisms are
causing a gradual cultural shift away from pollution control and waste treatment and
towards pollution prevention and cleaner production.
With regard to primary accident prevention, the same economic signals are not really
there [2].  Firms do not pay the full social costs of injuries to workers (or to the public)
and firms are under-insured.  Unlike pollution, which has to be reckoned with as a
part of production planning, accidents are rare events and their consequences are
not factored into the planning process.
Furthermore, an organisation’s gradual emissions or wastes can be observed and
calculated for any given time period, and this information can be used to measure
the effectiveness of the organisation’s pollution prevention efforts.  Because acute
chemical accidents are relatively rare events, an organisation implementing an
effective chemical safety program may therefore receive no form of positive
feedback whatsoever.  Because the safety system is working, accidents do not
occur.  Of course, a hazardous chemical plant may eventually receive negative
feedback, but only when it is too late to take preventive measures.
In earlier work, one of the authors [2] summarised the barriers to primary prevention:
These include: (1) inadequate information about the potential for catastrophic
accidents, the significant costs of secondary prevention and mitigation and the
costs of chemical accidents, and the existence of inherently-safe[r]
alternatives; (2) insufficient economic incentives - in the form of workers’
compensation, the tort system, regulatory fines, and insurance; (3)
organisational and managerial barriers -- linked to corporate attitudes,
objectives, structure, and internal incentives, and the lack of a labour-
management dialogue on safety; (4) a lack of managerial awareness and
expertise about inherently safe[r] technologies; (5) inadequate worker
knowledge about primary accident prevention; (6) technological barriers
limiting primary accident prevention; and (7) regulatory problems.  Primary
prevention shares some of these barriers with secondary prevention and
mitigation, but these barriers are of different importance.
Although firms sometimes do anticipate accidents and try to avoid them, the
expenditures for adequate prevention have not been, and are not likely to be,
invested without the right incentives.  To the extent that the firm knows that the costs
of maintenance and the inflexibility of traditional safety approaches are greater than
using more reliable inherently safer approaches, the firm may respond by changing
its technology.
One way of providing firms with more visible economic incentives would be to
encourage them to exploit the opportunity to prevent accidents and accidental
releases (1) by identifying where in the production process changes to inherently
safer inputs, processes, and final products could be made and (2) by identifying the
specific inherently safer technologies that could be substituted.  The former we call
Inherent Safety Opportunity Audits (ISOAs).  The latter we call Technology Options
Analysis (TOAs). Unlike a hazard, risk, or technology assessment, these techniques
seek to identify where and what superior technologies could be adopted to eliminate
the possibility, or to dramatically reduce the probability, of accidents and accidental
releases 4.
This paper reports on a research project undertaken for the EU Commission and
designed to gain practical, firm-based experience regarding the feasibility of
conducting both ISOAs and TOAs in firms partnering with technically-informed
consultants, in hopes that this would lead to the adoption of inherently safer
technologies by those firms. In our fieldwork, these two activities were performed
separately in some cases, and together in others.  Both are necessary to implement
the best changes possible.
From a general safety perspective, it is widely recognised that safety performance is
determined by three elements:
• management and organisational factors,
• technological factors, and
• behavioural factors (also referred to as the human dimension, i.e., people)
These three factors interact and influence the safety of industrial manufacturing and
production processes through their effects on the willingness, opportunity, and
capability of organisations and people to change.
In some approaches that promote the adoption of inherent safety, the emphasis is on
mainly technological factors, i.e., on identifying and disseminating information on
superior technologies. In the current approaches to safety management -- especially
those falling under the rubric of Safety Management Systems -- the emphasis is on
management and organisational factors, and also on the human dimension,
addressing the management of safety; these approaches assume minimal
technological change, implicitly leaving the core and secondary production
technologies essentially unchanged.  Both of these distinct approaches are by
themselves insufficient to maximise the adoption of desirable inherently safer
technologies and frustrate further progress in safety performance and continual
progress in safety management.  There is therefore a clear need, both from a
technical point of view and from an industrial practice perspective, for a generally
accepted approach that bridges traditional safety management with inherent safer
technology.
                                                          
4 A hazard assessment, in practice, is generally limited to an evaluation of the risks associated with the
firm’s established production technology and does not include the identification or consideration of
alternative production technologies that may be inherently safer than the ones currently being
employed.  Consequently, hazard assessments tend to emphasize secondary accident prevention and
mitigation strategies, which impose engineering and administrative controls on an existing production
technology, rather than primary accident prevention strategies, which utilize input substitution and
process redesign to modify a production technology.  In contrast to a hazard assessment, a technology
options analysis would expand the evaluation to include alternative production technologies and
would facilitate the development of primary accident prevention strategies.
In this paper we report on first attempts to develop and implementing a methodology
for the encouraging complementary managerial and technological changes aiming at
making companies more willing and able to identify and use (or develop) inherently
safer technologies for achieving Inherently Safer Production (ISP).
With regard to environmental protection from gradual pollution and waste, similar
developments have taken place.  Environmental improvements are often realised
through the development, adoption, and implementation of Cleaner Technologies, as
distinct from end-of pipe treatment.  However, methodologies to promote Cleaner
Technologies always go beyond identifying or developing technology per se.  This is
most often expressed in the terms “Cleaner Production” and “Pollution Prevention”.
Cleaner Production/Pollution Prevention, as distinct from Cleaner Technology, also
addresses organisational and human factors [13, 22].  In a similar fashion, we adopt
the analogous term Inherently Safer Production.
3. ELEMENTS OF AN INHERENTLY SAFER PRODUCTION APPROACH
3.1 Timing and Anticipation of Decisions to Adopt (or Develop) Inherent Safety
It is generally acknowledged that taking action “as early as possible” in the design,
planning, and construction of industrial plant is vital for the realisation of the most
promising options for Inherently Safer Technologies (ISTs).  This means that IST
principles should be taken into account early in the design process of chemical
producing and using plants, or even in the Research & Development process aiming
at developing new technologies for production. This raises questions about how and
when organisational and human factors should come into play with technological
factors.  Technological design and engineering usually precede organisational
design and selection of personnel.  Thus, the early-as-possible principle has a
different meaning with respect to managerial and organisational factors.  It implies
that organisational procedures must aim at the recognition and early adoption of
relevant IST options in the R&D and in the Design stage, before the plant is
operational.  These may be complemented by other (later) procedures that facilitate
the implementation of promising IST options once the scope of production and
general plant design are finalised.  Both are important organisational elements for
the concept of Inherently Safer Production (ISP).
The creation of appropriate internal incentives is also important.  With respect to the
human dimension, we argue that the awareness of the key actors (managers,
engineers, researchers, safety experts, operators, and maintenance workers)
should, from the very beginning, be focused on opportunities for IST.  In this way,
willingness (on the part of key actors in the firm), as an attitude, can precede the
actual knowing of specific options for IST.  Achieving this organisational awareness
and willingness may require leadership of “enlightened” (top) managers.  In the
management of technology literature, there is the concept of the “technology
gatekeeper” whose technical expertise is crucial for determining what technologies a
firm adopts.  We similarly use in this report the term ”managerial gatekeeper” to
denote the importance and need for organisational leadership.
It should be emphasised, however, that awareness in industry is not only an issue for
individuals. Awareness of individuals is heavily influenced by social factors like
communication and cooperation with other key-actors and by (formal or informal)
corporate incentives.  Ultimately, awareness in industry is mainly a collective
awareness. The collective awareness in a company is greatly dependent on (but
also reflected by) the existing corporate culture.  The corporate culture is known to
reflect the real core values of a company (which is not by definition the same as the
official core values such a presented in ‘senior management statements’) on what is
being rewarded or not in everyday practice, on subjects and issues that can be
addressed or instead are off limits, and on missing elements in the awareness of
managers and employees.
Therefore, awareness that influences willingness, and leadership, but also new
forms of communication and cooperation and a possible shift in corporate (safety)
culture, are all crucial elements for Inherently Safer Production.  Good and
successful examples set by companies seen as peers may also strongly stimulate
industry.
3.2 Life cycle aspects
Another aspect of the time dimension of inherent safety concerns where in the life
cycle of the plant the decision to consider inherent safety arises [23].  It is generally
acknowledged that the benefits of inherently safer technologies may persist
throughout the life cycle of a chemical process, or plant. This is actually one of the
reasons why anticipation of the need for inherent safety is so important; being early
can generate more benefits.
However, this all too often leads to the conclusion that IST is not relevant for existing
plants, explaining why managers of existing facilities are often not much interested in
IST. Their plants seem already technologically determined, and IST seems
interesting only as a research or engineering curiosity.
Today’s plants are, however, not as technologically rigid as they may seem.
Customers ask for tailor-made products, often in small quantities, and delivered as
soon as possible. This increases the need for flexibility in plants and processes.
Added-on safety usually decreases flexibility, while inherently safer technologies can
increase flexibility.
Furthermore, changes in existing plants take place, and change management is a
well-known element of safety management.  The methodologies for Inherently Safer
Production should therefore be potentially attractive in every stage of the
plant/process’s life cycle, and could support the development of a new form of
change management that is directed towards inherently safer alternatives.
4. A METHODOLOGY FOR INHERENTLY SAFER PRODUCTION
As is the case with the concept of cleaner production, it essential that organisational,
human and economic aspects are, together with technological aspects, integrated
into the concept of inherently safer production.  We developed a methodology for
involving the several organisational components of the industrial firm in inherently
safer production. The methodology envisions five phases:
• Preparatory work, obtaining firm commitment, & designing the focus of the project
• Identifying Inherently Safer Options for Implementation
• Implementation of Inherently Safer Options
• Monitoring & evaluating implementation
• Evaluation of the final project
Each phase consists of several sub-phases, and the use of some specific tools (see
Table 1). Partner firms were engaged in the study to explore the usefulness of the
methodology.  Considerable effort was required to convince companies to cooperate
in what we regarded as innovative research. Two partnerships were created in the
Netherlands, one with Hoogovens Steel Strip mill Products (HSSP) for a pilot in their
Hydrochloric Acid Regeneration plant and the other with Dutch State Mines (DSM),
the Logistics Department of the HydroCarbon Unit.  In Greece, one partnership was
created with ELAIS (Editable Fats and Oils, part of the Unilever group) for two pilots,
one focusing on its present installations in Athens and the other involving the design
of a new plant for refining editable oils. The pilots in the Netherlands were carried out
by researchers from NIA-TNO (now TNO Work & Employment), while the pilots in
Greece were carried out by researchers from Ergonomia, Ltd.
The results of the experience in the case studies were analysed in terms of
willingness, opportunity, and capability of the partner firms to adopt and implement
Inherently Safer technologies 5. Willingness is seen as comprising initial
                                                          
5  The importance of these three factors was first developed in the context of necessary and sufficient
conditions for stimulating pollution prevention or cleaner production technologies [24]. The three
affect each other, of course, but each is determined by more fundamental factors.
Willingness is determined by both (1) attitudes towards changes in production in
general and by (2) knowledge about what changes are possible.  Improving the latter involves aspects
of capacity building, while changing the former may be more idiosyncratic to a particular manager or
alternatively a function of organisational structures and reward systems.  The syndrome “not in my
term of office” describes the lack of enthusiasm of a particular manager to make changes whose
benefit may accrue long after he has retired or moved on, and which may require expenditures in the
short or near term.
Opportunity involves both supply-side and demand-side factors.  On the supply side,
technological gaps can exist (1) between the technology used in a particular firm and the already-
available technology that could be adopted or adapted (known as diffusion or incremental innovation,
respectively), and (2) the technology used in a particular firm and technology that could be developed
(i.e., major or radical innovation).  On the demand side, four factors could push firms towards
technological change -- whether diffusion, incremental innovation, or major innovation -- (1)
regulatory requirements, (2) possible cost savings or additions to profits, (3) public demand for safer
industry, and (4) worker demands and pressures arising from industrial relations concerns.
Capacity or capability can be enhanced by both (1) increases in knowledge or
information about inherent safety opportunities, partly through formal Technology Options Analyses
or Inherent Safety Opportunity Audits, and partly through serendipitous transfer of knowledge from
suppliers, customers, trade associations, unions, workers, and other firms, as well as reading about
safety issues, and (2) improving the skill base of the firm through educating and training its operators,
workers, and managers, on both a formal and informal basis.  Capacity to change may also be
influenced by the inherent innovativeness (or lack thereof) of the firm as determined by the maturity
and technological rigidity of particular product or production lines  [24].  The heavy, basic industries,
which are also sometimes the most unsafe industries, change with great difficulty, especially when it
comes to core processes.
commitment, awareness and the will to make a move towards inherently safer
technology, and therefore concerns mainly organisational and human aspects.
Opportunity is seen as a combination of technological and economic aspects:
technological options for inherently safer technologies, and the economic
attractiveness/feasibility thereof.  Capability is seen as the organisation’s capability
to identify inherently safer options, and to implement inherently safer options.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Finally, it deserves re-emphasising that it is not only technologies that are rigid and
resistant to change.  Personal and organisational flexibility is also important.
Table 1: The Inherently Safer Production Approach
____________________________________________________________________________
Phase One: Preparatory Work, Firm Commitment, and Focus of the Project
1.  Start-up and Obtaining Commitment from the Firm
This first step entails obtaining general commitment and cooperation from management,
selecting possible (parts of the) plant/unit/process/division, obtaining the specific commitment
of the management of that (part of the) plant/unit/process/division, and formulating and
formalising the project goals and project plan.
2.  Initial Design and Preparation
This step involves the establishment of an internal project team within the selected
plant/division, assisted by the external consultants, to construct the project plan.
3.  Conduct a Traditional Safety Audit
This safety audit is used for identifying inputs and material flows, processes and
intermediates, and final products--but with special attention paid to human-material/process/e-
quipment interactions that could result in (a) sudden and accidental releases/spills, (b)
mechanical failure-based injuries, and (c) physical injuries--cuts, abrasions, etc. as well as
ergonomic hazards.
Additional sources of adverse effects/safety problem areas are records/knowledge of in-plant
accidents/near misses, equipment failures, customer complaints, inadequate secondary
prevention/safety procedures and equipment (including components that can be rendered
non-operable upon unanticipated events), inadequacies in suppliers of material and equip-
ment or maintenance services.
4.  Selection of Candidate Processes or Operations within the Firm
This step entails the selection of candidate processes or operations within the firm that
warrant special attention.  The discovery of where the process could benefit from the adoption
of IST is the outcome of an Inherent Safety Opportunity Audit done within this and the next
tasks.  The criteria for identifying these include three categories: (a) general safety
information, (b) symptoms of inherent unsafety, and (c) inefficiency of safety management.
Phase Two: Identifying Inherently Safer Options for Implementation
5.  Functional Review
This step reviews the functional purposes of materials, equipment, processes and operations-
-noting obvious inefficiencies in material/water/energy use and gradual pollution, and obvious
hazards due to spatial combinations of functions.
6.  Specific Set of Search Questions
This step constructs a specific set of search questions to guide identification of opportunities
for material substitution, equipment modification/substitution, changes in work practices and
organisation, modifications in plant layout, and changes in final product.
7.  Brainstorming to Generate Inherently Safer Options
This step involves the planning of creative brainstorming sessions by the project team to
generate as many initial options as possible.
8. Construction of Search Process for Information on Inherently Safer
Options/Alternatives.
This step involves planning the process of using external potentially useful information
sources, including so-called “solution databases” (such as compiled by Lyngby, DK. the
Danish EPA and TNO), safety performance/benchmarking data, literature on process safety
and reliability, literature on cleaner production/pollution prevention, academic
experts/researchers -- including the TNO Work and Employment/Ergonomia project staff, in-
plant expertise including plant workers/union, suppliers, equipment manufactures, other
domestic firms, foreign firms and technology, and national/international unions.
9.  Identification of Promising Inherently Safer Options
Identification of promising alternatives/options for materials, equipment, processes, operati-
ons, work practices and organisation.
10.  Design of a Consistent Set of System Changes
With the involvement of both production and safety/environmental personnel, design
internally-consistent sets of 2-3 alternative overall system changes encompassing multiple
component changes related to 9 above.
11.  Feasibility Study
Conduct feasibility studies utilising rough relative economic (cost) and safety assessment for
these 2-3 system changes.  Also included are environmental impacts and organisational
impacts and requirements.
12.  Commitment of the Project Team
Present results of the feasibility studies to the project team and obtain their commitment an
endorsement.
13.  Recommendations to Management
Recommend system changes to the firm management.
Phase Three: Implementation of Inherently Safer Options
14.  Facilitate Decision Making
Mobilise the decision-making processes within the plant/unit to implement the selected
system, recognising overall firm imperatives and constraints.
15.  Preparation of Implementation
Work with in-plant personnel (both production and safety/environmental people, and the
safety and health committee) to design general approach to changes in the plant/unit.
Phase Four: Monitoring and Evaluating Implementation
16. Monitor Actual Design Changes
The step involves the in-plant project team in the monitoring and evaluation of the progress
and success of the implemented options/system on the bases of safety, quality, technology,
costs, and environmental impact.
Phase Five: Final Project Evaluation
17. Evaluation of Overall Project
This final step involves the project team in evaluating the outcome of the inherent safety
project in the firm and formulating additional recommendations.  This includes the results of
plant management evaluation.
5. RESULTS
5.1 Summary of Main Findings
The willingness of companies to adopt and implement inherently safer options was
found to be different for new installations, existing installations that will remain in
production for several years (retrofit cases), and for installations that are more or less
at the end of their life-cycle (transitional stage).
In existing installations, the experience of the plant managers and on-site personnel is
vital for willingness and may be triggered by frequent plant or installation troubles and
associated safety problems. For a new plant/one contemplating expanding capacity, if
there is no experience with prior safety problems, the firm’s motivation for inherently
safer production may come from a more general pursuit of excellence, e.g. as part of
an encompassing total quality management policy.
Inherently safer technological options were identified in all four cases. The expert role
of technologically-oriented consultants, and an extensive external data search were
important for the identification of (especially the more fundamental) options.  Three
factors seem to have a positive influence on the adoption of options (1) being “early in
the life cycle” (e.g., at the design stage), (2) an in-company cross-functional workshop
on the principles of inherent safety that includes a brainstorming session for the
generation of inherently safer technological options, and (3) a facilitating role of the
consultants in the adoption process.
The results with regard to the economic factors are very striking in all four cases:
inherently safer options were identified that were not only economically feasible, but the
overwhelming majority had pay-back times of less than one or two years, even in the
existing plants. Thus, while at the beginning the economic imperative is not visible for
the adoption of inherently safer technologies, once identified, they do represent
economically attractive options.
The capability for generating, adopting and implementing inherently safer options
varied considerably in the four cases. The advances in this capability varied even
more.  In the two Dutch cases, the capability was increased by the intensive
cooperation between the company’s personnel and the consultants/researchers in the
pilot processes, especially during the workshops held to learn more about Inherent
Safety and to generate Inherently Safer Technology Options. In these two Dutch
cases, several initiatives in the respective action plans were specifically aimed at
increasing the plant’s capability to identify, adopt, and implement (future) inherently
safer options, although the options generated in workshops with the firm’s personnel
were not dramatic examples of inherently safer technologies.  In fact, many useful
options of secondary prevention were also identified.
In the case of the design of a new plant (in Greece), there was no relevant experience
within the plant from running and maintaining such a plant.  In the two Greek cases, the
consultants played an important expert role, which had a positive influence on the
generation of fundamental and important inherently safer options, but the consultants
were not able to exert a sufficiently positive influence on the firm’s capability to adopt
and implement these options. The consultants undertook extensive literature and other
searches in order to identify inherently safer technological options, but – unlike the
Dutch researchers – they did not involve the firm’s personnel in the generation of
options.  This may partly explain the slowness in the adoption of these improvements
by the firm.
The experiences in the four case studies show the importance of (1) factors
influencing the willingness of the firm to search for technological alternatives, (2)
using Inherent Safety concepts to develop a common language in the firm, (3)
strategic integration of the Inherently Safer Production (ISP) approach with Cleaner
Production or Pollution Prevention approaches [25, 26], and (4) the contribution of
ISP to flexible strategic management and continuous improvement.  Safety, Health,
and Environmental (SHE) Management must address not only technological aspects
of safety and environment, but managerial, organisational, economic, and human
aspects as well.  More detailed discussion of these issues is found below.
5.2 Influences on the Willingness of the Firm to Search for Technological
Alternatives
In the Greek cases, the managerial leadership of the company ELAIS was motivated
to have an outside evaluation of both their present and future technologies. This was
the partly the consequence of it's fairly well-developed Total Quality Management
(TQM), the integration of TQM principles in Leadership (the activities undertaken by
the highest management) and the deployment of TQM principles throughout the
company. The company has a genuine desire for production proficiency. ELAIS want
the best technologies.  However, the aim of ELAIS was to have an external expert
evaluate their technologies, not to build internal expertise in safety.
ELAIS people were not interested, and did not participate actively, in the search for
technological alternatives.  As a result of using an external expert approach, a
number of very interesting -- even significant -- inherently safer technologies were
identified in both Greek cases (existing plant and the design of a new facility).
Although the options identified were highly regarded by ELAIS, at the time of
evaluation of the cases it was not yet clear to what extent ELAIS is going to
implement the options.
Thus, throughout the Greek pilot projects there was practically no development
of the willingness to search for technological alternatives, and there was no
improvement of the capacity to adopt and implement promising inherently safer
technologies.  However, the firm was probably convinced of the value of having a
trusted consultant do an external technology options search.
This was different in the Dutch pilots at HSSP and DSM. In these two Dutch cases,
the companies motivation stemmed mainly from regular safety and operational
problems in existing installations. The companies had already tried to resolve these
problems themselves, even several times, sometimes with the help of external
experts (DSM case), but only with limited results.
The Dutch companies stepped into the project because they did not want more
external advice that did not work. They wanted to resolve their problems, and after
the presentation of the outline of the proposed project, they liked the idea that in
following the proposed methodology, they would start a process of bringing together
the fragmented know-how in the firm (including the know-how from preceding
attempts to solve problems), and integrate/compare that know-how with external
expertise.
In these Dutch cases, due to the active involvement of a variety of in-company
people, the feeling of ownership of the options generated was much stronger than in
Greek cases.  As a result, many serious options (in the HSSP case all serious
options) were in fact adopted in principle, were included in an action plan that was
approved by management -- and that was partly implemented and partly in the
process of implementation, at the time of the evaluation of the cases.  In the HSSP
case, several of the techniques that were introduced in the firm were also
spontaneously used by the company people to make progress with some other
environmental and quality problems they were facing.  This shows that as a result of
the process components in the methodology, they felt that they -- at least partly --
were the owners of these techniques, and they wanted to use it wherever it seemed
useful. As mentioned before, however, cooperative brainstorming did not yield the
identification of dramatic examples of inherently safer options.
Finally, we conclude that the motivation of the company, reflecting both the initial
motivation and culture of the company, has an impact on the development of the
willingness and capacity in the company. Another determinant is probably the role of
the researchers/consultants: in the Greek business culture, the companies expect
external expert advice, and the Greek consultants see themselves primarily as
experts.  In the Dutch culture, the companies are interested in expert advice, but also
in support and improvement of internal processes. As a result, the Dutch consultants
were much more regarded, and viewed themselves, as experts that had a role to
play, not only as a source of technical know-how, but also as change agents in a
possible shift from traditional safety towards inherently safer production.
5.3 Attitudes towards Inherent Safety
Earlier, we reviewed the knowledge about the paradigmatic difference between
inherent safety and secondary safety prevention.  In this section we discuss the
implications of these differences for what occurred in the pilot firms. It should be
realised that at the time the project began, these firms were usually thinking in terms
of traditional added-on safety.  Inherent safer alternatives may easily be rejected in
such a situation, as they usually interfere more intimately with the primary process
(this can easily be regarded as a complicating factor).  The associated benefits of
inherent safety measures (in terms of improved operability, flexibility and economics)
are different than the benefits of traditional safety approaches.
Therefore, the adoptions of inherent safety technologies, and a greater willingness to
develop or adopt such options, require a change in attitude and mind-set of the
persons involved (decision-makers and those who may influence those decisions).
On the organisational level, attitudes, mind-sets, and the do's and don'ts are
reflected in the company culture; an evolution in company culture may therefore also
be needed; resistance to change can be expected.
In the Greek cases, where there was minimal participation of company
representatives in the process of technical optional analysis, the mind-sets and
attitudes of company people remained basically unchanged. It is therefore not
surprising that ELAIS is still not sure what they will do with the inherently safer
options identified. Resistance to adopt the options was clearly felt in some cases or
departments.
In the Dutch cases, the process of options generation was predominantly organised
as collective learning and inspiring effort.  In this way, the persons involved more or
less automatically widened their scope on safety, and expanded their thinking to
include the inherent safety paradigm.  Because this was organised as a collective
process, the same was true for the local company culture.
On the other hand, the Dutch cases were both in existing facilities, and that fact
limited the feasibility of inherent safety, conceptually. As a result, not only were
inherently safer options identified and adopted, but at the same time some more
traditional safety solutions were also identified and adopted.
This mix of inherent and traditional safety measures could be regarded as a
weakness because the company was clearly not able to make a full paradigm shift
towards inherent safety.  On the other hand, it does not seem very realistic to think
that such a shift was possible in companies with largely fixed technologies and
businesses.  We tend to regard it as one of the basic strengths of the methodology
that inherent safety principles can be applied in existing facilities, and be
supplemented by traditional safety measures.  This demonstrates that inherent
safety principles are easily accessible for existing  companies, and easier to
integrate into safety decision making and into safety, health, and environment (SHE)
management systems and procedures [27]
5.4 Using Inherent Safety Concepts to Develop a Common Language in the
Firm
In the Dutch cases (HSSP and DSM), an important element was to bring together
people from different functions and disciplines in order to develop a common
understanding of the underlying technical problems of the technical and safety
troubles they faced. This was successful, not only in the way that they jointly
developed a deeper and broader understanding of their problems and options to
solve them, but also in the way that the participants were -- for the first time -- able to
communicate and cooperate effectively in this cross functional and interdisciplinary
setting. The reasons for this success might have the following explanations:
Safety was important to everyone, but it was the first time that they
consequently reflected and discussed the inherent safety characteristics of
their primary processes (instead of focusing on “additional safety measures”).
Because an ‘additional safety measure’ may belong mainly to a certain
discipline or function (e.g. maintenance), it may not be very interesting to
discuss this with other persons who have other disciplines or functions within
the firm.  In contrast, Inherent Safety concepts address the characteristics of
the primary process itself. This is the core business of the business unit, and
is relevant to everyone.
The Inherent Safety design principles (minimise, substitute, moderate, simplify
and optimise layout) are sound and easy-to-communicate principles that can
be understood with common sense. In this way, these inherent safety
concepts can form a user-friendly common language for all interested parties,
disciplines and functions.  This facilitates effective communication about the
production processes and the associated hazards and preventive activities.
As Argyris and Schön show [28] a common language is a prerequisite for
organisational learning processes.  Based on this project, we surmise that the
inherent safety principles can function very well as the shared conceptual
basis for organisational learning aiming at continuous safety improvement.
5.5 Economic Considerations
In the introduction we discussed the issue that, in general, there are no obvious
strong economic incentives for accident prevention.  However, when inherently safer
technological options were identified in the case studies, and their feasibility was
assessed, many options proved to have very short pay-back periods.  For example,
in the HSSP case we used a standardised in-company feasibility calculation for the
initial rough proposals in the first stage of the action plan.  To everyone’s surprise, all
nine options turned out to have pay-back times of less than one year.  From an
economic perspective, they were expected to be very profitable.  In the DSM case
too, all options were economically viable. What might be the explanation of the clear
existence of economic benefits without their being appreciated.   In a period with
ever-increasing competition, there seem to be some hidden but potentially very
relevant economic incentives for inherent safety.
It is important to characterise the nature of the benefits.  As expected, the benefits of
having potentially less accidents and incidents do not appear great, due to the
expected low frequency of incidents and accidents to begin with (and even less in
companies that are proficient in safety).  However, most benefits yielding positive
outcomes from inherently safer options stemmed from the realistic expectation of
having to spend less time trouble shooting.  This implies a greater on-line time of the
facility, but it also lowers the costs of maintenance and repair activities, including the
associated costs for replacement of components.  In other words, inherent safety is
associated with greater reliability of production, and of economic optimisation of
operability and maintenance of existing installations.  In sum, there certainly are
economic incentives that arise from these aspects, but these incentives by
themselves are currently not leading the way to inherently safer approaches.
5.6 Methodological Implications for Firms at Different Stages of Development
At the start of our research project, we developed a general methodology to be
tested in the pilots. Gradually we adapted this methodology to better reflect the
idiosyncratic cases of the respective pilot cases.  It turned out to be important for our
methodology whether the methodology is applied in plants (1) with existing and
continuing operations, (2) with existing operations in transition, or  (3) which are
preparing and designing new facilities/operations. The methodological differences
between retrofitting or expanding existing facilities and designing new facilities are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Methodological Implications for Facilities at Different Stages
Existing installations
(retrofit or expansion)
New installations Implications for the
Methodology: expect
Differentiation in
Existing or remaining
(safety) problems may
motivate the company for
inherent safety in parts of
the facility/unit
Safety problems are
known only at the design
stage, or from similar
existing installations.
the motivation/willingness
at the start to consider
inherently safer concepts
and options
Management, workers
and contractors are there
and have experiential
know-how; they can and
should be involved.
External consultants can
have important expert
and process roles, if they
are knowledgeable in
inherent safety.
The design is basically a
design engineer’s
activity.
Top managers are
involved in go/no-go
decisions only.
External consultants,
experts in inherent
safety, may be needed.
The participation of
people and feeling of
ownership during the
project
The (process) role of the
external consultants
Alternative technological
options that require a
rather fundamental
change of the
installations are easily
rejected for conceptual,
and economic reasons
Alternative technological
options can be relatively
easy integrated (and with
few additional costs) into
the design
The nature of the
alternative technological
options taken into
consideration, and the
feasibility thereof.
In existing plants only
input changes, and minor
process/re-engineering
changes, are likely to be
adopted.
In the category of existing installations, a further distinction can be made between
installations that remain operational, and installations that are almost at the end of
their life cycle and in transition (preparation of new installation, or substantial
innovation and/or expansion).
In installations in transition, it may be more difficult to find feasible options for
inherent safety, but on the other hand the company may be eager to know what
inherently safer options might be relevant for a future plant with possibilities for
innovations/expansion of output. Conceptually, the end of the current plant life cycle
approaches the start of the next new plant life cycle.
5.7 Strategic Integration of Different Approaches
Companies are confronted not only with inherent safety options, but also with options
for cleaner production/pollution prevention, quality improvement, etc. Furthermore,
companies have to make choices as to whether they will invest in inherent safety or
cleaner production (i.e. primary prevention), or in added-on safety measures, end-of
pipe technologies (i.e. secondary prevention).  The choice between these kinds of
options will be made on performance advantages and other trade-offs.  Most likely,
in every company, a mix of options/measures will be adopted, which is intended to
be the optimum mix in terms of safety, economic factors, and other trade-offs.
It is therefore vital for inherent safety methodologies to pay attention to the non-
safety trade-offs, and, to a certain extent, to the compatibility of inherent safety
approaches with cleaner production/pollution prevention on the one hand, and
traditional safety on the other hand. In the INSIDE toolkit  [29], the tool has therefore
been developed towards an Inherent SHE Toolkit. The methodology developed in
this research project starts with a clear focus on inherent safety, but clearly showed
itself to be very compatible with other safety approaches, and with environmental
and quality considerations.
Evaluating the project, it is very striking that the methodology seems to address
environmental safety, occupational safety and process safety in a balanced way. It
seems easy to integrate inherent safety with environmental or quality management
considerations.  The opposite is certainly not true: in an investigation of the impact of
cleaner technology databases, some cleaner technologies were shown to introduce
new hazards into the working environment [25].  One possible explanation of the
findings in this project is that we were from the beginning very much aware of both
the close link and relevance of inherent safety with cleaner production.  It is not clear
whether we unintentionally imparted this vision to the firms, or whether it is intrinsic
to our methodology and the concepts used therein.
5.8 Flexible Strategic Management and Continuous Improvement
Technical installations seem static, but they sometimes develop gradually.  Changes
are made regularly.  They are usually minor changes, but are sometimes more
substantial. Throughout time, gradual changes may lead to a substantially different
installation, where capacity has expanded, process conditions are modified, and
many components differ from the original design.  To guarantee safety in this gradual
change process, change management, which is closely related to the management
of maintenance, is an important element of safety management.  Every change
does, however, not only form a potential threat to safety, but is in principle also a
potential opportunity for the introduction of inherent safer elements in the plant.
Moreover it can be an opportunity for continuous (safety) improvement, even if
alternative technological processes are not very likely to be introduced in this way.
The two Dutch cases started with a focus on existing problems in the companies,
which were not solved by normal maintenance. The technical or maintenance
managers and workers played an important role in the option generating process
and in the adoption of the options.  We therefore regard our methodology a
potentially useful tool for flexible strategic management, aiming at continuous safety
improvement via the systematic adoption of inherently safer technological options.
5.9 Conclusions
The experience in the implementation an Inherently Safer Production approach
demonstrates in all four cases that substantial progress towards inherent safety can
be realised in economically attractive ways. This progress is evidenced by the
number of inherently safer technological options identified, but also by the nature of
the intervention, that  -- especially in the two Dutch cases -- showed that it can
contribute substantially to the willingness and capacity to develop and implement
inherently safer options by the companies, and in this way facilitate continuous
improvement in SHE Management.  (The reader is referred to the project report [30]
for descriptions of the specific technologies investigated in the partner firms and the
solutions suggested.)
The research shows that there is a great potential for methodologies on improving
inherent safety that can be integrated into SHE Management systems.  The newly
developed concept of Inherently Safer Production, that was developed during this
research project, shows itself to be viable, and can contribute to a strategic policy of
companies and governments aiming at inherently safer technologies.  A basic
strength of the concept is that it not only addresses technological aspects of safety,
but managerial, organisational and human aspects as well.  In this way the Inherent
Safety concept can go beyond the technological domain and becomes a tool for
strategic SHE Management.
6. RELEVANCE OF FINDINGS TO SEVESO II, THE IPPC DIRECTIVE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
The Guidelines to Seveso II suggest that firms should adopt inherent safety
approaches as the preferred strategy over traditional safety measures [17].  Our
research shows that inherently safer options can be generated in the design of new
facilities, but they can also be identified for application in existing installations, both
facilities undergoing retrofit and facilities contemplating expansion.  The evidence
shows that in all four cases, with a systematic Inherent Safety Opportunity
Audit/Technological Options Analysis, a number of useful and economically viable
inherent safety options can be identified.  Therefore, both these types of analyses by
industrial firms should be systematically encouraged.
From the perspective of the EU IPPC directive [18], the present study is relevant in
two ways. First, inherent safety includes a concern for the environment.  Inherent
safety is a needed complement to the traditional cleaner production/pollution
prevention approaches, because the latter too often neglects sudden and accidental
releases.   Secondly, the solutions database that is now being developed to support
the implementation of the IPPC Directive, should preferentially promote technologies
that both prevent gradual pollution and are inherently safer.  As a second best
strategy, a similar EU Database of Inherently Safer Technologies could be
developed, but the separation of gradual pollution and sudden/accidental releases is
not ideal.
From the company practice perspective, the methodology presented offers a
practical and economically attractive tool that may be integrated in the company's
SHE Management system. It can be used to comply with Seveso II and IPPC, and
initiate or contribute to the process of continuous improvement towards inherently
safer, healthier, and cleaner production.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY
We recommend the promotion of the concept of inherently safer production via the
dissemination of governmental policy statements and publications, and through legal
instruments, where appropriate. This should be complemented by the development
of training/education on inherently safer production for policy makers and inspectors
in the areas of accident prevention (both for occupational and environmental
accidents).  Further research in the development of ISP methodologies should be
encouraged in the research programmes of the European Commission.
The establishment of economic incentives (e.g., tax incentives) or requirements for
firm-based review of inherently safer technological options should seriously be
considered as a major policy option.  This review should be conducted both at an
overall process/scope-of-production level and at the level of the engineering of
hardware in actual installations, when firms start to plan new or expanded
production. We would argue that both an Inherent Safety Opportunity Audit and a
Technology Options Analysis should be encouraged by including them as highly-
recommended analyses in the next expansion of Seveso II guidance documents
issued by the EU [17].  Additionally, where appropriate as in the case of particularly
hazardous operations, these analyses should be made mandatory through the
expansion of existing EU directives, including Seveso II and the IPPC Directive [18],
and in Environmental Management Systems, both those of the EU [19] and those of
the International Standards Organisation (ISO) [20].
Because the concept of Inherently Safer Production can easily include Inherent
Safety, Health and Environment (Inherent SHE), this also calls for collaboration
between national and international policy-setting bodies concerned with occupational
safety and environmental safety.
A second cluster of recommended activities concerns development of supportive
Information Technology Tools.  This could include:
• The development of databases for Inherently Safer Technologies;
• The creation of a central website giving access to most relevant databases and
information sources on Inherent Safety
• The integration and/or cross-linking of databases for Cleaner Production/Pollution
Prevention and Inherently Safer Production [25].
• The screening of databases for Cleaner Production/Pollution Prevention for
compatibility with Inherent Safety
Furthermore, we recommend the creation of international networks of companies
and knowledge centres to work on the development of Inherently Safer Production.
Expansion of the UNEP Cleaner Production Centres to integrate Inherent Safety with
Cleaner Production/Pollution Prevention should be encouraged [25,26].
In our report to the EU Commission which sponsored this research, we also develop
guidelines for industrial firms based on our field research.  The reader is referred to
that report for a fuller discussion [30], well as for descriptions of the specific
technologies investigated in the partner firms.
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